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SUPERVISORS BEWARE: THE FAMILY AND
MEDICAL LEAVE ACT MAY BE HAZARDOUS
TO YOUR HEALTH
Michael L. Ripple*
Six years have passed since President William Jefferson Clinton
signed his first piece of legislation, the Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993 (FMLA).' After almost a decade of consideration, Congress
enacted the FMLA to establish a minimum standard for employee-leave
during times of medical necessity.2 Noting the growing number of dual-
earner households, 3 the FMLA's purpose is to guarantee job security for
those individuals forced to provide care for either their young children
or other family members afflicted with serious medical conditions.4
Under the FMLA, an "eligible employee"5 is entitled to a total of twelve
weeks of unpaid leave during any twelve-month period 6 for the follow-
ing reasons: to care for the birth or adoption of a child,7 to care for one's
own serious health condition, 8 or to care for a seriously ill family mem-
* J.D. Candidate 2000, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic Univer-
sity of America; B.S. University of Delaware 1994.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1999).
2. See Allan N. Taffet, Family Medical Leave Act Five Years Later,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 4, 1997 at 1.
3. See29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(1) (1999).
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(2)-(4).
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A). The term "eligible employee" means an
employee who has been employed for at least 12 months by the employer from
whom leave is requested under § 2612 of this title and "[the employee must
have been employed] for at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer
during the 12 month period." Id.
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A). The FMLA allows for leave for "the
birth of a son or a daughter of the employee and in order to care for such son or
daughter." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(B). Additionally, leave is granted
"[b]ecause of the placement of a son or daughter with the employee for adop-
tion or foster care." Id.
8. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). The statute provides leave for "a seri-
ous health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions
of the position of such employee." Id.
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ber.9 If a person takes FMLA leave, an employer must maintain that
employee's health benefits.10 Upon return to employment, the employee
must be reinstated to the position held when the leave commenced or to
a position of equal terms, conditions, and benefits of employment. These
benefits form the core protections mandated by the FMLA.
Despite the seemingly vast coverage afforded to individuals, the
FMLA is far from settled law with respect to a number of issues. One of
these issues, and the subject of this Comment, is whether the term "em-
ployer"1' as defined in the FMLA, extends beyond the corporate entity
to individual corporate supervisors.
Particularly troubling to the business community and to the district
courts that have addressed this issue is the apparent ambiguity created
by the definition. The definition of the term "employer" as provided by
Congress does not explicitly mention individual liability. Instead, the
FMLA's definition of "employer" provides that
any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or
activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more
employees for each working day during each of 20 or
more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding
calendar year; [this] includes any person who acts, di-
rectly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to
any of the employees of such employer.'
2
Because the language defining "employer" appears ambiguous with its
reference to the "any person" inclusion, courts have looked to other em-
ployment law statutes for guidance in interpreting the term "employer."
For example, some courts have looked to the meaning of "employer" as
defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 13 and Title VII.14 Tradition-
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). Likewise, leave is permitted "[iun order
to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such
spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health problem." Id.
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(2). "The taking of leave under section 2612
of this title shall not result in the loss of any employment benefits accrued prior
to the date on which the leave commenced." Id.
11. 29 U.S.C. §§,261l(4)(A)(i)-(ii)(I).
12. Id.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1999).
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry af-
fecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the cur-
rent or preceding calendar year: Provided, That prior to June 30,
1968, employers having fewer than fifty employees shall not be
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ally, all three of these statutes have been interpreted similarly because of
the language each uses to define "employer." Title VII, the most liti-
gated of the three statutes, provides that the term "employer" means "a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or
more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calen-
dar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of
such a person ....,15
Although the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII all preclude personal liabil-
ity for supervisors, courts have interpreted the term "employer" in the
FMLA similar to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 1 6 The FLSA
defines an "employer" as "any person acting directly or indirectly in the
interest of an employer in relation to an employee. ... , Under the
FLSA, some courts determined that personal liability attaches to anyone
acting in the interest of the corporate employer.' 8 These courts recog-
considered employers. The term also means (1) any agent of such
a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision of a State and any
agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a
State, and any interstate agency, but such term does not include
the United States, or a corporation wholly owned by the Govern-
ment of the United States.
Id.
14. See Carter v. Rental Uniform Service of Culpepper, Inc., 977 F. Supp.
753 (W.D. Va. 1997); Frizzell v. Southwest Motor Freight, 906 F. Supp. 441
(E.D. Tenn. 1995). Both cases, in holding that no individual liability for su-
pervisors existed under the FMLA, stated that other courts interpreting federal
anti-discrimination laws have generally not imputed individual liability upon
supervisors. However, the following cases hold that the statutory language
included in the FMLA closely tracks the language of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA). Therefore, since the FLSA imposes individual liability upon su-
pervisors, the courts held the FMLA does also. See Bryant v. Delbar Products,
Inc., 18 F. Supp.2d 799 (M.D. Tenn. 1998); Rupnow v. TRC, Inc., 999 F. Supp.
1047 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Beyer v. Elkay Mfg. Co., 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14459
(N.D. Ill. 1997); Johnson v. A.P. Products, Ltd., 934 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Waters v. Baldwin County, 936 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Ala. 1996); Knuss-
man v. State of Md., 935 F.Supp. 659 (D. Md. 1996); Reich v. Midwest Plastic
Eng'g, Inc., 1995 WL 478884 (W.D. Mich. 1995); Freemon v. Foley, 911 F.
Supp. 326 (N.D. Ill. 1995); McKiernan v. Smith-Edwards-Dunlap Co., 1995
WL 311393 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1998).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1998).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
18. See Reich v. Circle C. Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 1993);
see also Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Service, Inc., 161 F.3d
299, 303 (5th Cir. 1988).
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nized a similarity between the FMLA and FLSA statutory definitions of
"employer," which would include personal liability for individual super-
visors.
This Comment analyzes whether Congress enacted the FMLA as a
labor statute which should therefore follow the statutory construction set
forth in the FLSA or as an anti-discrimination statute such as the ADA,
ADEA, and Title VII. Section I of this Comment explores the origina-
tion, construction, and protections of the FMLA. Section II follows the
expanding case law interpreting this statute and sets forth how the ma-
jority of courts considering this vexing issue interpret the FMLA in the
same manner as the FLSA. Section III examines the reasoning used by
the courts in reaching their decisions and explains why the FMLA dif-
fers from anti-discrimination statutes. This difference is evident in that
the FMLA creates a statutory entitlement, whereas anti-discrimination
statutes only rectify identifiable discriminatory practices. Section IV
examines other statutory provisions, besides merely the definition of
"employer," that distinguish the FMLA from the other anti-
discrimination statutes. Finally, this Comment concludes that, while the
goals and application of the FMLA are similar to anti-discrimination
laws, this alone does not detract from Congress' intention to have the
FMLA operate consistently with the standards established in the FLSA.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE FORMATION OF THE FMLA
President Clinton signed the FMLA into law on February 5, 1993. As
part of his "People First" campaign, the President wanted the FMLA as
a cornerstone in the re-establishment of family values.19 Lauded as the
first piece of legislation addressing the needs of women working outside
the home, Congress enacted the FMLA in response to the growing strain
work imposed on both single and two-parent families. 20 Although the
Act was strongly criticized by the business community because of the
perceived expense to small businesses, Congress passed the FMLA in
response to a number of demographic, economic, and social changes in
American family life. 2' The impact of these changes continuously
forced families to balance the needs of family life against the economic
reality of the workforce.22 Based on these factors, Congress enacted the
19. See Issues '92, THE BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 1, 1992, at A10.
20. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(1).
21. See S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 7 (1993).
22. See id.
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FMLA "as a minimum labor standard to address significant new devel-
opments in today's workplace."2 Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT), a
staunch proponent of the FMLA, believed that Congress enacted the
FMLA as legislation mandating new labor standards, not unlike earlier
legislation initiated to cover Social Security, occupational safety and
health.24
In drafting the legislation, Congress attempted to strike a harmonious
balance between the growing evolution of the workforce 25 while con-
tinuing to recognize the needs of small employers. As with other labor
legislation, Congress recognized the private industry's failure to ade-
quately address the increasing demands on working families. This fail-
ure to relieve the pressure on American workers26 provided the backdrop
for the FMLA's dual nature: responding to the growing need among
workers to balance the reality of work against the need to provide medi-
cal and palliative care for family members.
During hearings on the FMLA, Congress noted that since 1950, the
number of women entering the workforce increased by one million
workers per year.27 As a result of this increased female participation in
the workforce, over two-thirds of women with school-aged children
worked outside the home by 1990.28 In part, this dramatic increase re-
flected the rising percentage of single-parent households headed by
women. The Senate Report on the FMLA indicated that, in 1988, the
percentage of single-parent households accounted for approximately
twenty-seven percent of all family groups having children under the age
of eighteen.29 Thus, keeping women employed emerged as "a critical
[issue] to keeping their families above the poverty line. 30
The Senate Report also emphasized the dramatic shift in America's
elderly population. With the improvements in medical care and bio-
23. Id.
24. See 139 Cong. Rec. S1254, S1257 (Feb. 3, 1993) (statements of Sen.
Dodd).
25. See S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 7.
26. See S. Rep. No. 103-3 at 7. "Before Congress will enact a statute ad-
dressing a pressing social problem, findings must indicate that corrective action
undertaken by employers is inadequate to relieve the social condition." Id.
27. See id. at 8.
28. See 139 Cong. Rec. H365, 367 (Feb. 3, 1993) (statements of Rep.
Gordon).
29. See S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 8.
30. Id.
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technology, the elderly became the fastest growing segment of the
population. 31 In fact, Congress found that approximately thirty-two
million Americans are over the age of sixty-five. 32 The National Com-
mittee on Aging also estimated 20-25 million Americans, or one out of
every five workers, have some care-giving responsibility for an older
relative.33 Based on these findings, Congress concluded that without a
comprehensive policy on family leave, further demands for elder care
would erode both familial relationships and the economy.34 These social
realities formed the background for Congress' desire to establish a new
labor standard.
In addition to the core protections set forth in the Introduction, when
an employee requests leave under the FMLA, an employer 35 may not
interfere with, restrain, or prevent any employee from exercising the
rights guaranteed by the Act.36 This provision prohibits any employer
from discriminating against employees who exercise their statutory
rights. Thus, the protection of the FMLA is twofold. First, it guarantees
individuals certain minimum family or medical emergency leaves that
employers must follow when complying with federal leave standards.
Second, the statute protects employees from any discriminatory prac-
tices the employer may use when an employee utilizes the features of
the FMLA. Together, these two-prongs create a cause of action for ei-
ther the denial of, or interference with, the rights afforded by the FMLA.
Even though the FMLA created far-reaching new coverage for em-
ployees, certain safeguards also exist to protect the employers' legiti-
mate interests. Prior to granting the requested leave, an employer may
request medical certification from an employee's health care provider
confirming that a serious medical condition exists which warrants the
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 9. See 'also 139 Cong. Rec. H365, H367 (February 3, 1993)
(statements of Rep. Gordon).
34. See S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 9.
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2). The term "employer" also includes "any per-
son who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of the
employees of such employer [and also] any successor in interest of an em-
ployer." Id.
36. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). "It shall be unlawful for any employer to
interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any
right provided under this subchapter." Id.
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employee's leave of absence.37 If requested, an employee must provide
such certification.38 The certification must include the date the serious
condition arose, the potential duration of the condition, the medical facts
surrounding the condition, and a statement that the employee is needed
to provide care. 39 In addition, the employer may request that the em-
ployee obtain a second opinion, albeit at the employer's expense.4°
Congress granted these safeguards to employers as an attempt to balance
the interests of family life with the need for businesses to maintain their
operational structure.
Congress authorized the Department of Labor (DOL) to enforce the
specific provisions of the FMLA. 41 Under this explicit grant of author-
ity, the DOL adopted regulations that expanded upon, and attempted to
clarify, the statutory provisions of the FMLA. In these regulations, the
DOL interpreted the term "employer" to include
[a]ny person who acts directly or indirectly in the inter-
est of an employer to any of the employer's employees.
The definition of "employer" in section 3(d) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), similarly in-
cludes any person acting directly or indirectly in the
interest of an employer in relation to an employee. As
under the FLSA, individuals such as corporate officers
"acting in the interest of an employer" are individually
liable for any violations of the requirements of the
FMLA.42
While these regulations explicitly state that the FMLA's provisions
are based upon those contained in the FLSA, not all district courts have
interpreted the FMLA's definition of "employer" as such. Furthermore,
only one circuit court has yet to rule on the issue. As the next section of
this Comment will explore, the issue remains undecided as to whether
the FMLA functions as an anti-discrimination statute, like the ADA,
ADEA, and Title VII, or functions in accordance with the FLSA's pro-
visions.
37. See 29 U.S.C. § 2613. "An employer may require... certification is-
sued by the health care provider of the eligible employee or of the son, daugh-
ter, spouse, or parent of the employee. . . ." Furthermore, "(t]he employee shall
provide, in a timely manner, a copy of such certification to the employer." Id.
38. See id.
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 2613(b)(1)-(4).
40. See 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c)(1).
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 2654.
42. 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d) (1993) (repealed).
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II. CASE LAW INTERPRETING "EMPLOYER" UNDER THE FMLA
Almost two years elapsed between the enactment of the FMLA and
the emergence of the issue of individual liability for supervisors under
the Act. In 1995, Freemon v. Foley43 became the first case to confront
the issue of whether an employee's immediate supervisor qualified as an
"employer" under the FMLA. Using the statutory framework provided
by the FLSA, in addition to an "operational control test," the Freemon
court held that a supervisor could face individual liability under the
FMLA.44
From December 13, 1988, until July 7, 1994, plaintiff Jimmye Free-
mon was employed at the Mt. Sinai Hospital Medical Center in Chicago
as a nutritionist in the Women with Infants and Children (WIC) pro-
gram. 45 During Freemon's employment, the WIC program operated un-
der the control of the Mt. Sinai Hospital. Freemon's supervisors at the
WIC program included Gilda Ivy, Juan Corbin, and Steven Foley.46 In
turn, Foley reported to Steven Hulsh, Vice President of Human Re-
sources for Mt. Sinai.47
On May 29, 1994, Freemon learned that her five-year-old son devel-
oped chicken pox. 48 The next business day, Freemon notified her im-
mediate supervisor, Gilda Ivy, that she would remain home from work
to care for her child.49 Two days later, Freemon discovered that her
other son, Joshua, had developed a contagious fungal infection.50 To
ensure both children's care, Freemon desired to remain home.51 Free-
mon notified Ivy of her intentions, during which, Ivy informed Freemon
that her vacation time would cover any absences until June 13, 1994.2
At the conclusion of this vacation time, Ivy expected Freemon to return
to work at Mt. Sinai."
Unfortunately, while the boys were recovering from their initial ill-
43. 911 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. I11. 1995).
44. See id. at 331.
45. See id. at 328.
46. See id.
47. See id.





53. See 911 F. Supp. at 328.
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nesses, Joshua also contracted chicken pox. 54 On June 16, 1994, three
days after Freemon's vacation time expired, Freemon contacted both Ivy
and Foley to inform them that she expected to return to work on June 21,
1994.55 After returning to work, Freemon provided a copy of her sons'
medical records to Corbin. 56 Yet, Freemon's supervisors remained un-
satisfied with her documentation explaining her lengthy absence from
work.5" Foley communicated the discrepancies surrounding Freemon's
documentation to Mr. Hulsh, and as a result, she was suspended pending
an investigation into the extended absence. 58 The subsequent investiga-
tion concluded that Freemon failed to comply with the company's re-
quest for additional medical information regarding her sons' conditions.
On July 7, 1994, Foley contacted Freemon and informed her of her dis-
charge. 59 Because of her discharge, Freemon filed a complaint and
named Mt. Sinai, Ivy, Foley, Hulsh, and Corbin as co-defendants.
60
Defendants Ivy, Hulsh, Corbin, and Foley moved for summary judg-
ment, contending that alleged violations of the FMLA limit actions to
those against "employers.' The defendants claimed they were not
"employers" under the FMLA for the following reasons: (1) they did not
employ fifty or more people during the previous twenty weeks, 62 (2)
they did not serve as officers or directors of Mt. Sinai, and (3) they did
not nor possess any "unilateral authority" over employment decisions.63
Because they did not qualify as "employers" under the FMLA, the de-
fendants claimed that Freemon could not pursue an action against them
in their individual capacities.
Ifi addressing the defendants' motion, the Freemon court noted that




.57. See id. at 328-329.
58. See 911 F. Supp. at 329. On June 28, 1994, Ivy confronted Foley with
the problem encountered by Freemon's documentation. Ivy complained about
Freemon's absence and recommended her termination. Id.
59. See id. Foley requested that Freemon supply either documented medi-
cal history or a medical release for her children's medical records. See id.
60. See id. at 326.
61. See id. at 330.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(I). The FMLA requires an employer who ...
employ[s] 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or
more calendar work weeks. . ." Id.
63. See Freemon, 911 F. Supp. at 330.
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amines the statutory definition, 64 while the second part applies an "op-
erational control test" measuring whether "a defendant possessed super-
visory authority over the complaining employee in whole or in part over
the alleged violation. 65
After considering the defendants' motion, the court stated that the
issue of individual liability under the FMLA was one of first impression
in its circuit. 66 Noting that the plain language of the FMLA defining
"employer" appeared unclear, the Freemon court looked to other em-
ployment law statutes for their interpretations of "employer." In doing
so, the court examined comparable language contained in the ADA, the
ADEA, and Title VII case law.67 However, the Freemon court con-
cluded that the language used in these three statutes differed from that
used in the FMLA. While the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII all include
the "and any agent" language, the court found that the FMLA extended
employer status "to anyone acting directly or indirectly in the interest of
an employer., 68 In further differentiating the FMLA from these statutes,
the court stated that the regulations adopted for the FMLA followed
those used within the FLSA. 69 Based on these observations, the Free-
mon court concluded that the FMLA more closely mirrored the statutory
definition of "employer" utilized by the FLSA.70
Once the Freemon court embraced the FLSA's definition of "em-
ployer," it found that several simultaneous employers may exist, all of
whom could be held responsible for non-compliance with the Act.7' In
64. "Status as an employer under the FLSA is a question of law." Karr v.
Strong Detective Agency, Inc., 787 F.2d 1205, 1206 (7th Cir. 1985). Further-
more, "[tihe FLSA contemplates there being several simultaneous employers
who may be responsible for compliance with the FLSA." Freemon, 911 F.
Supp. at 331.
65. Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1987). The FMLA
borrowed this test from Title VII, which referred to the test as the "integrated
employer" test. See 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2181 (Jan. 6, 1995).
66. See Freemon, 911 F. Supp. at 330.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 331 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d)).
70. See 911 F. Supp. at 331. The court noted that the ADEA, ADA and
Title VII all defined "employer" similarly as a "person who employs a [certain
number of people]" and "any agent of such person." 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(5)(A)
(ADA); § 2000e(b) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (ADEA).
71. See id. at 331 (quoting Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d
962, 965 (6th Cir. 1991)).
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fact, the court recognized that case law interpreting the FLSA has ex-
tended liability not only to corporate officers, but also to those "who,
though lacking a possessory interest in the 'employer' corporation, ef-
fectively dominate its administration or otherwise act, or have the power
to act[,] on behalf of the corporation vis-a-vis its employees. 72 The
Freemon court determined that as long as a defendant exercised some
control over the alleged employment violation, individual liability could
attach."
After applying this "operational control test" to the specific factual
findings at issue, the court concluded that defendants Ivy, Hulsh, and
Foley "exercised sufficient control over plaintiffs ability to take pro-
tected leave to qualify as 'employers' under the FMLA."0 4 Accordingly,
the court denied the defendants' summary judgment motion with the
exception of Corbin, who the court found lacked supervisory control."
When faced with the issue of statutory interpretation of "employer"
under the FMLA, another case followed the reasoning set forth in Free-
mon. In Waters v. Baldwin County,76 an employee's supervisors brought
a motion to dismiss, claiming they were not "employers" under the
Act. 7 After viewing the case as one of first impression in the circuit,
the Waters court noted that the plain language of the FMLA includes
immediate supervisors as "employers. 7 8 The court based this reasoning
on the Freemon court's analysis that the FMLA mirrors the FLSA word
for word in its definition of "employer." After finding this similarity
between the FMLA and the FLSA's statutory construction, the Waters
court recognized that liability could attach to those other than the corpo-
rate entity.79 As with the Freemon court before it, the Waters court
found that the DOL issued regulations affirmatively addressing whether
a supervisor, acting in the interest of the employer, should be treated as
an employer.80 Although the court realized that individual liability ex-
72. Reich, 998 F.2d at 329 (5th Cir. 1993); See also Herman, 161 F.3d at
303 (5th Cir. 1988).
73. See Freemon, 911 F. Supp. at 331; Dole, 942 F.2d at 966.
74. Freemon, 911 F. Supp. at 331.
75. See id. at 332. The court found no evidence to show Ms. Corbin played
any role in the discharge of Freemon.
76. 936 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
77. See id. at 862.
78. See id. at 863.
79. See id. at 863-64 (quoting Dole, 942 F.2d at 965).
80. See id. at 864.
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isted under the FMLA, it failed to apply the operational control test be-
cause of the limited factual findings available at the time of the motion
to dismiss.8'
In McKiernan v. Smith-Edwards-Dunlap Co., 82 the court also held that
the definition of "employer" contained within the FMLA closely paral-
lels that used by the FLSA.8 3 On April 17, 1988, Smith-Edwards-
Dunlap [hereinafter Smith-Edwards] hired Joseph McKiernan as a
driver/operator.8 4 Five years later, in November 1993, McKiernan re-
quested a leave of absence from Smith-Edwards to care for his wife who
was experiencing serious pregnancy-related complications.8 5 Smith-
Edwards granted this leave with the stipulation that McKiernan return to
work in February 1994.6 On February 2, 1994, McKiernan requested
another absence from Smith-Edwards because his wife and unborn child
were still experiencing serious health problems.8 7 Smith-Edwards
granted this leave as well, but with McKiernan's agreement, discontin-
ued his health insurance benefits.
8 8
On March 5, 1994, McKiernan's baby was born prematurely. 89 As a
result, the baby remained in intensive care for two-and-one-half months,
during which time McKiernan supplied Smith-Edwards with the re-
quired medical records required by the FMLA. 90 However, according to
Smith-Edwards, McKiernan failed to return to work by May 2, 1994, the
81. See 936 F. Supp. at 864.
82. 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 43, 686, 1995 WL 311393 (E.D. Pa.
1995).
83. See id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
84. See McKiernan, 1995 WL 311393, at *2.
85. See id. McKieman requested, and Smith-Edwards granted, an initial 90
day, unpaid leave of absence.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. The parties disputed whether Smith-Edwards set a date for
McKiernan to return to work. See id. McKiernan claimed that the Personnel
Director told him to "do whatever was necessary to care for his wife and fam-
ily" without giving him a specified date to return to work. See id. However,
Thomas Dougherty, Human Resources manager at Smith-Edwards, stated that
the company only granted McKiernan another 90 day leave, good until May 2,
1994. See id. Dougherty also alleged that he told McKieman "to check in with
the company from time to time and be ready to work on May 2." Id.
89. See McKiernan, 1995 WL 311393, at *2.
90. See id.
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date Smith-Edwards claimed McKiernan agreed to return to work.91 On
May 17, 1994, after attempting to contact McKiernan, Smith-Edwards'
Production Manager, Robert Jardel, sent a letter to McKiernan explain-
ing he was terminated immediately for the failure to return to work by
May 2, 1994.92 Thereafter, McKiernan filed suit against both Smith-
Edwards and Jardel, alleging unlawful termination under the FMLA.93
Defendant Jardel moved for summary judgment, claiming that his
position was not covered by the FMLA's statutory definition of "em-
ployer." As both the Freemon and Waters courts before it, the McKier-
nan court looked to the plain language in the FMLA. Noting that the
FMLA definition of employer appeared unclear from statute, the
McKiernan court relied on the FLSA because of the regulations insti-
tuted by the DOL.94 After accepting the similarity between the FMLA
and FLSA, the McKiernan court held, consistent with other interpreta-
tions of the FLSA, that "any individuals. . . 'acting in the interest of an
employer' are individually liable for violations of the sfatute." 95 Fur-
thermore, the court found that FLSA case law interpreted the "acting in
the interest of an employer" language to include any person that pos-
sesses the authority to hire or fire an employee. 96 Based on this ration-
ale, the court found the FMLA definition of "employer" broad enough to
encompass defendant Jardel, and thus denied him summary judgment.
However, the court stated that although Jardel signed the letter dis-
charging McKiernan, there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Jardel qualified as an "employer" under the "operational con-
trol" test of the FMLA.97
Beyer v. Elkay Manufacturing Co. 98 also examined the question of
individual liability under the FMLA, and expanded its analysis beyond
that contained in Freemon, Waters, and McKiernan. In Beyer, two indi-
vidual defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that they
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at * 1. Besides the claim under the FMLA, McKiernan also al-
leged claims under state law for wrongful discharge, intentional infliction of
emotional distress and punitive damages. Id.
94. See McKiernan, 1995 WL 311393 at *1.
95. Id. at '3.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. 1997 WL 587487 (N.D. Il. September 19, 1997).
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did not qualify as "employers" under the FMLA. 99
The court began its evaluation by looking into the statutory language
used in the FMLA. 00 While recognizing that the statute only applies to
employers of fifty or more employees,' 0 l the court noted that the term
"employer" also applies to "any person who acts, directly or indirectly,
in the interest of [such] employer to any of the employees of the em-
ployer."10 2 Noting that there was no circuit court precedent on the issue,
the court examined the holdings of both Freemon, which established
individual liability under the FMLA, and Frizzell v. Southwest Motor
Freight,10 3 which followed anti-discrimination statutes in precluding
individual liability. Adopting the reasoning from Freemon, the Beyer
court found the language of the FMLA defining "employer" matched
that used by the FLSA. 0 4 The court rejected using the language con-
tained in both the ADA and Title VII because the language used in both
statutes contains the clause "any agent of such person."'0 5 By distin-
guishing this agency law language, the court declined to establish indi-
vidual liability because the clause itself invokes the theory of respon-
deat superior.106
99. See id. at *3.
100. See id.
101. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i).
102. 29 U.S.C. § 261 1(4)(A)(ii).
103. 906 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. Tenn. 1,995).
104. See 1997 WL 587487 at *3.
105. Id.
106. See id., at *8. The Beyer court referred to a case from the Seventh Cir-
cuit in which the Court questioned individual liability under the ADA. See
EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995). The
language of the ADA forbids discrimination by any employer "engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees.., and any agent
of such person." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). In finding that no individual li-
ability existed under the ADA, the Court first recognized that the language of
the ADA defining employer mirrored that used in both the ADEA and Title
VII. Accepting the reasoning of four other circuits in precluding individual
liability, See Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402 (1 1th Cir. 1995); Birbeck v. Marvel
Lighting Co., 30 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 1995) (ADEA); Grant v. Lonestar, 21 F.3d
649 (5th Cir. 1994) (Title VII); and Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., 55 F.3d
377 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that no liability exists under Missouri statute
similar to the ADA), the Seventh Circuit held that the individuals who do not
meet the independent definition contained within the ADA cannot be held indi-
vidually liable for violations of the Act. Thus, in finding no individual liabil-
ity, the Court specifically addressed the inclusion of the agency language
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As a further comparison between the employment statutes, the court
recognized that the FMLA possesses a minimum employee threshold, as
do both the ADA and Title VII, 07 while the FLSA contains no such pro-
vision. 08 The court found this argument compelling, yet determined
that this ambiguity alone was not sufficient to dismiss the claim against
the individual defendants. 10 9 Despite of the apparent inconsistency be-
tween the minimum employee thresholds included in the employment
statutes, the Beyer court found that other factors existed that separated
the FMLA from the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII. For example, the court
noticed that the regulations enacted by the DOL copied the definition of
"employer" contained within the FLSA." 0 These regulations, as inter-
preted by the court, provide for individual liability."' In addition to the
DOL regulations, the court also noted that the FMLA allows for punitive
damages, whereas the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII provide merely for
back pay and equitable damages.' 2 Thus, the court concluded that the
mere fact the FMLA contains a minimum employee threshold could not
support a finding precluding individual liability like that used by the
anti-discrimination statutes.'
In spite of the decisions in Freemon, Waters, McKiernan, and Beyer,
not all courts have embraced the FMLA as consistent with FLSA ac-
tions. In Frizzell v. Southwest Motor Freight," 4 the court decided the
first case to view the FMLA as an anti-discrimination statute, similar to
Title VII case law." 
5
Initially, the court focused on a claim brought under the FMLA and
Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA)." 6 The THRA's definition of
"employer" includes "the state, or any political or civil subdivision
therof [sic], and persons employing eight (8) or more persons within the
state, or any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indi-
through the use of respondeat superior.




111. See29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d) (1998).
112. See 1997 WL 587487, at *3.
113. See 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14459, at *9.
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rectly."' 17 Because the THRA and Title VII both contained agency lan-
guage defining "employer," the defendant claimed that both statutes
should be similarly construed to preclude individual liability."' After
viewing the statutory provisions of both the THRA and Title VII, in-
cluding case law interpreting both, 19 the court concluded that the differ-
ences between the THRA and Title VII were "not such that require dif-
ferent analyses or interpretations.', 20 The leading case interpreting the
THRA similar to Title VII, Arnold v. Welch, 12' held that an individual
may not be held personally liable under the THRA. Accepting the rea-
soning of the Arnold court, the court in Frizzell stated that
the intent of Congress was to incorporate respondeat
superior principles under Title VII, the remedies under
Title VII are remedies an employer, not an individual
would provide, and individual liability under Title VII
is inconsistent with the limitation of its reach to em-
ployers with fifteen or more employees, compels this
Court to hold that under the THRA, individuals not
otherwise meeting the statutory definition of "employ-
ers" are not liable.
122
Once the Frizzell court determined that the THRA and Title VII ex-
tended the same coverage to "employers," it noted Arnold's application
to individual liability.' 23 Applying the analysis from Arnold to the
FMLA claim, the Frizzell court decided to dismiss the plaintiffs claim
against the defendant in his individual capacity. The court granted the
117. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-102(4)(e) (1997).
118. See Frizzell, 906 F. Supp. at 444.
119. See Arnold v. Welch, 1995 WL 785572, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. 1995); Jones
v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1231 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that the
THRA and Title VII should be construed similarly); but cf Wood v. Emerson
Electric Co., 1994 WL 716270, at *13-14 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) and Gifford v.
Premier Mfg. Corp., 1989 WL 85752, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
individuals may be liable under THRA). Based on these findings, the court
found persuasive the holding of the Eighth Circuit in Lenhardt v. Basic Insti-
tute, 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1995). In Lenhardt, the court found that the
definition of "employer" in the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) was the
same definition used by Title VII. Id at 379-380. Since the MHRA and
THRA are similar, the Frizzell court found this applicable to the case sub ju-
dice.
120. Frizzell, 906 F. Supp. at 448.
121. 1995 WL 785572, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. 1995).
122. Frizzell, 906 F. Supp. at 449.
123. See id.
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motion to dismiss based on the fact that a literal reading of the FMLA
limited liability strictly to "employers. 124 Because Arnold construed
the meaning of employer under the THRA and Title VII to preclude in-
dividual liability, the Frizzell court also believed that the FMLA pro-
tected individuals who are not "employers" under the Act.'
25
In Carter v. Rental Uniform Service of Culpepper, Inc.,26 the court
also held that individual liability did not exist under the FMLA. In
Carter, the plaintiff argued that the FMLA should be interpreted like the
FLSA127 and cited a Fourth Circuit case holding that defendants can be
personally liable for violations of the FLSA.' 28 The court, however,
refused to accept the argument presented by the plaintiff. It distin-
guished Brock from the instant case because that decision limited its
holding to where the individual defendant hired, fired, and directed the
employees.129 The court noted that nothing existed in the plaintiffs
complaint worthy of assigning the individual defendant employer status,
comparable to that which the court considered in Brock.130 To the con-
trary, the Carter court stated that "[p]ersonal liability for violations of
Federal employment laws generally has been rejected unless the defen-
dant engaged in non-delegable acts like harassment."'131 Based on the
reasoning that no individual liability existed under the ADA, ADEA, or
Title VII, the Carter court adopted Frizzell and held that no claim of
individual liability exists under the FMLA.
While the previous cases were limited to the district court level, the
court in Wascura v. Carver132 became the first circuit court to address
the issue of whether public officials, in their individual capacities, are
"employers" under the FMLA.
Although the appellants argued the Eleventh Circuit should apply its
holding from Busby v. City of Orlando,133 in which no individual liabil-
ity attaches to claims under Title VII, the court did not find this argu-
ment persuasive. After comparing the FMLA's definition of "employer"
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. 977 F. Supp. 753.
127. See id. at 759.
128. See Brock v. Hamad, 867 F.2d 804, 808, n.6 (4th Cir. 1989).
129. See 977 F. Supp. 753, 759 (quoting Brock, 867 F.2d at 808, n.6).
130. See id. at 759-60.
131. Id. at 759.
132. 169 F.3d 683 (1 1th Cir. 1999).
133. Wascura, 931 F.2d 764 (11 th Cir. 1991).
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with the ADA, ADEA, Title VII and the FLSA, the court concluded that
"Congress, in drafting the FMLA, chose to make the definition of 'em-
ployer' materially identical to that in the FLSA.... ,134 The court con-
cluded the only difference between the FMLA and FLSA definition of
employer was that the FLSA included the phrase "in relation to" before
the phrase "to any of the employees."'
' 35
In addition to the nearly identical statutory language of the FMLA, the
Eleventh Circuit identified that DOL regulations referred directly to the
FLSA in defining who qualifies as an employer. 36 Therefore, because
only a slight grammatical difference separated the two statutes, the Was-
cura court concluded that FLSA case law controlled the definition of
employer under the FMLA. 137 Though individual liability may exist
under the FLSA, the court also recognized the need to consider "the to-
tal employment situation in determining whether an entity qualified as
an 'employer' under the Act.' 3' After considering all the employment
factors, the Wascura court dismissed the claims against the defendants
in their individual capacities because the defendants were public offi-
cials. 39 The court reached this conclusion by applying FLSA case law
which stated that a public official, with no control over a plaintiff's con-
ditions of employment, could not qualify as an employer in his individ-
ual capacity under the FLSA.
140
134. Wascura, 169 F.3d at 686.
135. Id. The court distinguished the FMLA from the Title VII, ADA, and
ADEA because those statutes all include the phrase "any agent of such a per-
son" while the definition of employer in the FMLA is more expansive. Id.
136. See id. at 685-686.
137. See id. The court stated that "the difference is a matter of grammar, not
substance." Id. at 686.
138. Id. See Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1011 (11th Cir. 1995). In
Welch, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the police chief and certain
Cullman County Commissioners qualified as employers under the Equal Pay
Act. The Equal Pay Act is nearly identical to the FLSA. In dismissing the
claim against the defendants in their individual capacities, the court analyzed
the total employment situation and found the defendants had no authority to
hire, fire, or modify the conditions of employment. Without this authority, the
defendants fell outside of the statutory definition of employer under the Equal
Pay Act. Id.
139. See Wascura, 169 F.3d at 687.
140. See id.
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III. THE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT BEHIND THE FMLA:
A DEMONSTRABLE PARALLEL TO THE FLSA
Although Congress failed to directly discuss supervisor liability in
drafting the FMLA, the mere fact it fails to explicitly mention individual
supervisors in the definition of "employers" does not settle the issue.
41
Only if the court finds the language ambiguous should it then examine
the legislative history to determine Congressional intent. 42 In the
FMLA, the definition of "employer" is not clear at first glance. By use
of the words "any person," the definition appears to cover all levels of
management, yet a court must analyze the totality of the FMLA's his-
tory in conjunction with agency law guidelines to conclude that Con-
gress did not intend to limit liability strictly to the business employer.
Traditionally, Congress has enacted anti-discrimination statutes to
eliminate employer conduct resulting in unfair discrimination against
employees based on race, color, religion, age or disability in terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment.143 In order to meet these Congres-
sional goals, courts have liberally interpreted the statutes "to secure
compensation for victims of discrimination and to deter future potential
discriminators."'
144
With the FMLA, it appears that Congress exceeded its authority to
enact anti-discrimination legislation. 45 "It is well settled that in ex-
pounding a statute, [the court] must not be guided by a single statement
or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law,
141. "[A] court should not look for an implication of congressional intent
[nor] infer intent from mere silence." Wyss v. General Dynamics Corp., 24 F.
Supp.2d 202, 208-209 (D. R.I. 1998).
142. See United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961).
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting employer discrimination based
upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); 29 U.S.C. § 623 (prohibiting
employer discrimination based upon an employee's age); and 42 U.S.C. §
12112 (prohibiting discrimination based upon a qualified individual's disabil-
ity).
144. Davida Isaacs, Comment, "It's Nothing Personal"-- But Should It Be?:
Agent Liability for Violations of the Federal Employment Discrimination Stat-
utes, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 505, 518 (1996).
145. Recently, the Supreme Court has struck down several acts of Congress,
stating that Congress exceeded their power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Seminole Indian Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 517 U.S, 44 (1996).
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and to its object and policy.' 46  Knowing this, the issue remains
whether the means adopted by Congress are "congruent and proportional
to the goal of preventing gender discrimination."' 147 Under the FMLA,
an individual is allowed twelve weeks of unpaid leave to care for either
the birth of a child, or, to care for a family member with a serious health
condition. 48 Thus, the FMLA creates an affirmative entitlement which
distinguishes it from other anti-discrimination legislation. 49 As the
court stated in Thompson v. Ohio State University Hospital,
[t]he creation by statute of an affirmative entitlement to
leave distinguishes the FMLA from other statutory pro-
visions designed to combat discrimination. . . .Con-
gress, inasfar as it purports to rely on the Fourteenth
Amendment as the basis of the FMLA, is attempting to
dictate that the Equal Protection Clause . . . requires
that employees be furnished twelve weeks of leave per
year. This is patently the sort of substantive legislation
that exceeds the proper scope of Congress' authority
under § 5.150
Due to this entitlement, the means employed by the FMLA are not con-
gruous or proportional to the goal of equal treatment.' 5' Congress may
not create new constitutional rights using the catch-all approach of the
Fourteenth Amendment. This recognition that the FMLA creates an
entitlement strengthens the proposition that the FMLA functions as a
new labor standard, not a means of combating anti-discrimination.
In spite of this entitlement, Mr. Boyd Rodgers, in his 1997 article on
the FMLA, 52 argues that the FMLA is an anti-discrimination statute.
He claims the Frizzell court identified the proper analysis of the defini-
tion of "employer" under the FMLA as an anti-discrimination statute,
utilizing respondeat superior principles, like the language found in Title
VII.
153
146. Wathen v. General Electric Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997).
147. Thompson v. Ohio State Univ. Hospital, 5 F. Supp.2d. 574, 579 (S.D.
Ohio 1998).
148. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
149. See Thompson, 5 F. Supp.2d. at 579.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 580.
152. See Boyd Rodgers, Note, Individual Liability Under the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Senseless Detour on the Road to a Flexible
Workplace, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1299, 1336-37 (1997).
153. See id. at 1336.
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However, contrary to the argument that the FMLA tracks the meaning
of other anti-discrimination legislation,15 4 Congress omitted any refer-
ence to respondeat superior language while defining "employer" in the
FMLA itself. While both the FMLA and FLSA definitions of "em-
ployer" include "any person acting, directly or indirectly, in the interest
of an employer,"'55 the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII explicitly contain
the language "and any agent of such person." 56 For instance, Title VII
defines the term to mean "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in
each of the twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
year, and any agent of such person....,'" To interpret the phrase "and
any agent," courts have rejected the "plain meaning approach,"'158 which
calls for conjunctively reading "a person" with "and any agent,"'159 in
favor of the Supreme Court's interpretation of agency principles used
within a federal statute.16° In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 16 1 the
Court held that by adding the agency language into the statutory defini-
tion of employer, Congress intended the courts "to look to agency prin-
ciples for guidance in the area of employer liability."'162 Furthermore,
the Sixth Circuit has held that a narrow, literal reading of the agent
154. See id. at 1340.
155. FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203; FMLA, 28 U.S.C. § 261 1(4)(A)(ii).
156. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5XA).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
158. This "plain meaning" approach to statutory construction can mean that
"either the statute is unambiguous or the ordinary meaning of a statute's lan-
guage should receive greater weight than legislative history or policy argu-
ments." Rebecca White, Vicarious and Personal Liability for Employment
Discrimination, 30 GA. L. REV. 509, 547, n.188 (1994). Thus, courts inter-
preting these anti-discrimination statutes have included agents within the
statutory meaning of "employer" and withheld personal liability. See Id.
159. See AIC, 55 F.3d at 1281.
160. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 71; Wathen v. General Elec., 115 F.3d 400, 405-406 (6th Cir.
1997); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l. Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993). In
Meritor, the Court stated that "Congress' decision to define 'employer' to in-
clude any agent of an employer ... surely evinces an intent to place some lim-
its on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held
responsible." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 71. However, while the "Supreme Court
found that Congress' purpose was to define the scope of liability of the em-
ployer, it said nothing about any liability on the part of the employee/agent."
Id.
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clause in section 2000 (b) of Title VII implies that an employer's agent
is a statutory employer for purposes of liability. Thus, the primary rea-
son Congress included the "and any agent" language was to ensure that
courts impose respondeat superior liability upon employers for the acts
of their agents.
63
In this context, it becomes obvious that Mr. Rodgers' reliance on
Frizzell is misplaced. Rodgers' analysis assumes that the Frizzell court
thoroughly examined the FMLA and decided that its provisions provide
the same framework as those used by Title VII. t64 However, it is evi-
dent the court failed to conduct any inquiry into the FMLA at all. The
Frizzell court, in fact, limited its discussion only to the application of
Title VII to the THRA without making any logical connection to the
FMLA.' 65 Although the court identified Title VII's incorporation of
respondeat superior language in defining "employer," the court neither
rationalized, nor explained, the difference between that statute's defini-
tion and the one used by the FMLA. This approach specifically ignores
the content of certain case law interpreting Title VII. In an opinion re-
lied upon by the Frizzell court, the Seventh Circuit stated, "the actual
reason for the 'and any agent' language in the definition of 'employer'
ensure that courts would impose respondeat superior liability upon em-
ployers for acts of their agents. 166 Therefore, because the Frizzell court
failed to develop a correlation between the FMLA and Title VII inter-
pretations of the term "employer," including the "and any agent" lan-
guage, the analysis in finding that no individual liability exists is clearly
flawed. 167
As noted under the FLSA, it is well-settled law that a corporate offi-
cer, sued individually and not in his official capacity, is liable along
with the corporation for violations of the FLSA.'6  This individual 1i-
163. See AIC, 55 F.3d at 1281.
164. See Rodgers, supra note 153, at 1335-1336.
165. See id. at 1336.
166. AIC, 55 F.3d at 1281.
.167. See Rodgers, supra note 153, at 1335-1336. Mr. Rodgers admits that
the court only gave scant attention to the differences between the statutory dif-
ferences of "employer" in the FMLA and Title VII. See id.
168. Reich v. Midwest Plastic Eng'g, Inc., 1995 WL 478884 at *5 (W.D.
Mich. 1995). "The overwhelming weight of authority is that a corporate officer
within operational control of a corporation's covered enterprise is an employer
along with the corporation, jointly and severally under the FLSA for unpaid
wages." Id.
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ability exists because courts have held that the term "employer," as
contained within in the FLSA and FMLA, is definitively broad enough
to permit naming many employees, rather than just the corporate entity
or officer, as a party-defendant. 169 In defining "employer" under the
FLSA, the Seventh Circuit embodied what is now the majority approach
of personal liability under the Act. The Seventh Circuit, in Riordan v.
Kempiners, held that the FLSA "permit[s] naming another employee...
as defendant, provided the defendant had supervisory authority over the
complaining employee and was responsible in whole or in part for the
alleged violation."' 170 By utilizing this approach, the court, in effect,
established the "operational control test" other courts have used in de-
fining "employer" under the FMLA.
The Fifth Circuit followed this reasoning in Reich v. Circle C. Invest-
ments, Inc.171 In Circle C., the issue was whether personal liability at-
tached to two co-owners of a nightclub, in addition to the corporate en-
tity, for alleged violations of the FLSA. 172 The court initially deter-
mined that the FLSA definition of "employer" applies to "any person
acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to
an employee.' 73 Expanding further on the definition provided by the
Riordan decision, the Circle C. court found that the FLSA applied to
"an[y] individual, though lacking a possessory interest in the 'employer'
corporation [who] effectively dominates its administration, or otherwise
acts, or has the power to act, on behalf of the corporation vis-a-vis its
employees."'
' 74
Applying this rule to the facts, the court concluded that although the
defendant had no ownership interest in the corporation, he exerted suffi-
cient control over the employees of the club through a consultation
agreement to fall within the FLSA's definition of "employer."'" Thus,
169. See Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1987); Dole v.
Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1991) ("The FLSA
contemplates there being several simultaneous employers who may be respon-
sible for compliance with the FLSA."); Hodgson v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc., 444
F.2d 609, 611-612 (3rd Cir. 1971).
170. Riordan, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1987)
171. 998 F.2d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 1993).
172. See id. at 324.
173. Id. at 329; see also Dole v. Haulaway, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 274, 286 (D.
N.J. 1989); 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
174. 998 F.2d at 329.
175. See id.
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the Fifth Circuit recognized that an individual can qualify as an "em-
ployer" under the FLSA if he independently exercises control over per-
sonnel matters as part of his/her regular duties. Using the framework set
forth in Circle C., and after considering the difference between the
agency law language included in Title VII against the FMLA, the logical
conclusion is that Congress did not intend to limit the term "employer"
in the FMLA to the same coverage employed in Title VII.
176
The second part of the liability status for an individual defendant in-
cludes an "operational control test," like the one used in Circle C. This
test is the second prong for determining liability under the FMLA, under
which a supervisor has the opportunity to demonstrate that his actions
were not deliberate violations of the Act. The McKiernan court appro-
priately applied this test to determine whether individual liability should
attach to the corporate supervisor. Since the question of whether a per-
son is an "employer" is a question of law, the McKiernan court appro-
priately determined that more facts were necessary to determine whether
an individual supervisor's status qualifies as an "employer" under the
FMLA. Given the facts set forth in the motion for summary judgment, it
remained unclear whether the individual supervisor possessed the actual
authority to fire the employee or merely fulfilled the administerial role
of notification. 177 In reaching this conclusion, the court correctly de-
clined to declare the individual defendant an "employer" for purposes of
the FMLA. If Joseph McKiernan had alleged sufficient facts to prove
that the individual supervisor possessed "operational control" over him,
the outcome would have been different. Recognizing that the FMLA
closely follows the FLSA, the McKiernan court correctly interpreted the
applicable case law and considered the possibility that supervisors could
be individually liable for violations of the FMLA.
176. In contrast, the FMLA defines employer more expansively than the
ADA, ADEA, and Title VII. See Wascura, 169 F.3d at 686.
177. See id. at *3. Although the court applied the FLSA interpretation of
"employer" to the FMLA statute, the fact that Jardel signed McKieman's letter
of discharge remained insufficient to establish Jardel's authority in making the
actual decision to terminate employment. Id.
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IV. OTHER STATUTORY PROVISIONS SUPPORT INTERPRETING
THE FMLA LIKE THE FLSA
A. Department of Labor Regulations
Congress explicitly authorized the Department of Labor to implement
regulations designed to further the policies of the FMLA.178 It is un-
controverted that the DOL possesses the power to draft and implement
certain regulations consistent with the intent of Congress in the original
Act. 17 9 Although the regulations promulgated by administrative agen-
cies and government entities may not have the same force of law, they
are entitled to significant weight due to the agency's expertise. 80
A number of courts interpreting the FMLA have looked to the DOL
regulations for guidance beyond the apparent similarity between the
FMLA and FLSA. According to the Wascura court, the applicable Code
of Federal Regulations provision constituted a large role in determining
that the FMLA should be given the same meaning as its counterpart in
the FLSA. The court cited the relevant provision in the regulations and
concluded that "individuals ... acting in the interest of the employer are
individually liable under the Act."'' 1 Based on this interpretation, the
Wascura court determined that the DOL drafted the regulations broadly
enough to incorporate individuals, such as corporate officers or those
exercising control over employees conditions of employment, as acting
in the interest of an employer. 8 2 Therefore, because the FMLA's regu-
lations were derived directly from, and cited directly to, the FLSA, the
Wascura court determined that it logically follows that corporate super-
visors can be susceptible to individual liability under the FMLA' 3
178. See 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (1999).
179. See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al., 467
U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974). In Chev-
ron, the Court upheld a challenge against the power of the EPA to implement
regulations controlling pollution-emitting devices. The Court stated that "[tihe
power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created pro-
gram necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to
fill any gap left, explicitly or implicitly, by Congress." 467 U.S. at 843.
180. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
181. Wascura, 169 F.3d at 686.
182. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.104.
183. See Reich, 1995 WL 478884 at *6.
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The Supreme Court, in Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines Inc., 184 held that it
is proper for lower courts reviewing DOL regulations to show deference
to the agency's interpretation of an ambiguous provision in the Act, as
long as Congress has delegated policy making authority to the agency.
85
While it is clear that Congress granted the DOL authority to implement
the regulations, the lower court must evaluate whether the DOL's inter-
pretation of the ambiguous provision is "reasonable."' I8 6  Here, the
DOL's interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the intent of
Congress. Although Congress failed to explicitly provide for supervisor
liability in the Act, the regulations promulgated by the DOL do not limit
or misinterpret the language given in the FMLA. In fact, the DOL real-
ized the substitution of language from the FLSA in defining "employer"
under the FMLA. Before implementing the regulations based upon the
similar language, the DOL invited public comment on the provisions of
the FMLA. After considering the public comments on the issue of su-
pervisor liability, the DOL again reinforced that Congress borrowed the
definition of "employer" directly from the FLSA. 187 The DOL main-
tained this approach in the introduction of the interim final rules on June
4, 1993. This consistent approach led the DOL to reasonably conclude
that the definition of "employer" is identical between the two statutes,
and therefore, recognized that supervisors may be personally liable for
violations of the FMLA. 88
While valid policy arguments exist both for and against personal li-
ability, the fact remains that via the notice and comment period, the
agency considered all the relevant factors in reaching their final ruling.
Although commentators expressed concern regarding the effect of this
policy, a court considering interpretation of the DOL's regulations must
"properly rely upon the administration's views of wise policy to inform
184. 501 U.S. 680 (1991). In Pauley, the petitioner sought review of the
denial of benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. Id. The issue focused on
the regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor, specifically, what
level of deference should be given to an agency's interpretation of a seemingly
ambiguous statute. Id.
185. See Pauley, 501 U.S. at 681; Chevron,'467 U.S. at 866.
186. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845. "A court may not substitute its own con-
struction of a statutory provision for a reasonable determination made by the
administrator of the agency." Id.
187. See The Family and Medical Leave Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2181
(1995) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d)).
188. See id.
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its judgments. ' 8 9 Therefore, because the agency properly evaluated the
language and intent of the statute, the regulations promulgated by the
DOL should be given controlling weight by courts interpreting supervi-
sor liability for violations of the FMLA.
B. Penalties
Another fact that supports interpreting the FMLA similar to the FLSA
is the penalties established under the FMLA. Within the FMLA, the
penalties imposed are more expansive than those traditionally imposed
by anti-discrimination statutes.' 90 While the FMLA includes a provision
for equitable relief,191 like most anti-discrimination statutes, the FMLA
also includes a provision providing for punitive damages equal to the
amount of lost wages, benefits, and other compensation. 19' The FMLA
further defines that a right of action to recover these damages may be
maintained against "any employer."' 93 This inclusion of "any employer"
differentiates the FMLA from other anti-discrimination statutes. High-
lighting this contrast, the Seventh Circuit in a recent case involving the
ADA concluded that when Congress defined "employer" in the ADA it
granted remedies that only employing entities, and not individuals,
could provide.' 94 However, in the FMLA, Congress limited the punitive
damages available against any employer but noted that such damages are
also applied to individuals, not only corporate entities.195 Additionally,
189. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
190. See Rebecca Wilson, Note, Using Case Law and Strategies to Defend
Family and Medical Leave Act Claims, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 534, 544 (1997)
(stating that counsel should look to the FLSA to interpret the damages provi-
sion under the FMLA).
191. See 29 U.S.C. § 2616(B). The FMLA provides for "such equitable
relief as may be appropriate, including employment, reinstatement, and promo-
tion." Id.
192. See 29 U.S.C. § 2616(A)(iii).
193. See 29 U.S.C. § 2616(2).
194. See Paul J. Kennedy, When Supervisors Are Sued, 42 SOC'Y FOR HUM.
RES. MGMT. 124 (Jan. 14, 1998) (discussing EEOC'v AIC Sec. Investigations,
Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1279 (7th. Cir. 1995).
195. In 1991, Title VII amended the damages provision of the Act to include
punitive and compensatory damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. While some
plaintiffs have argued that these stiffer penalties extend to individual supervi-
sors, courts have concluded that nothing in the legislative history of the Act
supports the view that damages were expanded for the purpose of creating indi-
vidual liability for supervisors. See Jan Henkel, Note, Discrimination by Su-
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the FMLA allows for recovery of liquidated damages equal to the sum
of any salary, wages, employment benefits, or other compensation de-
nied or lost to such employee by reason of the violation.1 96 Interest may
also be applied to the damages and is to be calculated at the current
rate. 97 Consistent with Congress' intention to establish a labor stan-
dard, these equitable and punitive relief provisions closely follow those
set forth in the FLSA. 198 Thus, this inclusion of increased civil penalties
in the FMLA strengthens the argument that Congress intended to de-
velop a labor statute like the FLSA. 99
C. Minimum Employee Provision
It has been stated that "[i]f Congress decided to protect small entities
with limited resources from liability, it is inconceivable that Congress
would allow civil liability to run against individual employees. 2 0
While this may be true, language in the FMLA demonstrates the intent
of establishing the Act as a labor standard, distinctively different than
the concepts contained within the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII. Through
the addition of the minimum employee threshold in the FMLA, Con-
gress intended to protect small businesses without using the blanket
coverage guaranteed by anti-discrimination statutes. Congress took great
care to remember the economic effects a new labor standard would im-
pose on the business community by creating an exemption for busi-
nesses with fewer than fifty employees. 20 ' By creating an exemption for
pervisors: Personal Liability Under Federal Employment Discrimination Stat-
utes, 49 FLA. L. REv. 767, 774-775 (1997). "It is a long stretch to conclude
that Congress silently intended to abruptly change its earlier vision through an
amendment to the remedial provisions of the statute alone." AIC, 55 F.3d at
1281.
196. See AIC, 55 F.3d at 1281.
197. See id.
198. However, the FLSA also provides for criminal penalties. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b).
199. In US. v. Ron Pair Enter. Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989), the Court
held that there are few instances where the Court will deviate from the lan-
guage of the statute itself. See id. This deviation is only limited to "rare cases
[in which] the literal interpretation of a statute will produce a result demonstra-
bly at odds with the intentions of its drafters." Id.
200. Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 553 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Miller,
991 F.2d at 587).
201. See 139 Cong. Rec. S1254, S1260 (Feb. 3, 1993) (statements of Sen.
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small businesses, the FMLA actually excludes from coverage approxi-
mately ninety-five percent of the workforce.
202
Part of this analysis focuses on determining which entity best served
the role of implementing statutory goals and thus, accepting liability.
Focusing on the frameworks of the statutes themselves, the courts have
nearly unanimously held that employers best serve this function.2 3 Un-
der the FMLA, providing individual liability for an employee's supervi-
sor is consistent with the need for greater accountability in the work-
place. Supervisors play a central role in decisions involving family
leave, through which, family policies are only effective to the extent that
supervisors support them. While one author contends that the adminis-
trative requirements are more appropriately applied to business entities
when the statutes themselves are silent on the issue of supervisor liabil-
ity,204 the factual evidence supports the contrary. As another article
stated
[e]mpirical data shows that employers have experi-
enced little difficulty in implementing family and
medical leave. A survey of employers in four states
that require parental leave found that ninety-one per-
cent of respondents said that they did not have a prob-
lem implementing the laws. Thirty-nine percent found
implementation extremely easy, while only nine per-
cent found implementation difficult. Further, seventy-
one percent reported no increase in training costs; fifty-
Levin). "The sponsors of this legislation have taken great care to incorporate
provisions which protect business interests while still providing for family
leave, seeking to lessen the burden on businesses, and make implementation of
this leave a smoother procedure." Id. Furthermore, extensive statistical testi-
mony indicated that the impact produced on the employers would be minimal.
See Id. at S 1255 (statements of Sen. Dodd); see id. at S 1259 (statements of Sen.
Lautenberg); see id. at 1260 (statements of Sen. Levin).
202. See 139 Cong. Rec. S1254, 1262 (Feb. 3, 1993) (statements of Sen.
Kerry). In referring to the exemption of employers with less than fifty employ-
ees, Mr. Kerry stated that "th[e] provision alone exempts 95% of U.S. business
and half of all workers." Id.
203. "Assuming a trickle-down theory occurs, courts have held the employer
liable because it could subsequently punish the discriminatory employee for the
damages caused upon it." Vodde v. Indiana Michigan Power Co., 852 F. Supp.
676, 681 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (holding that "the deep pocketed employer.., can
be counted on to be the most effective guardian of the marketplace").
204. See Henkel, supra note 195, at 772-3 (exploring the reasons to withhold
personal liability under Title VII).
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five percent reported no increase in administrative
costs; and eighty-one percent reported no increase in
the cost of unemployment insurance. Only a small mi-
nority reported significant cost increases in training,
administration, and unemployment. Regarding health
insurance costs, seventy-three percent of the respon-
dents reported no increase.
205
Thus, finding liability for those who possess control over an em-
ployee's terms or conditions of employment better serves to deter future
potential violations. By holding supervisors to the same standard as the
business employer itself, the FMLA insures an effective means of
pressing supervisors not to act or engage in certain conduct. Unlike
Title VII, which depends on businesses to monitor their employment
practices, the fear of individual liability from the FMLA provides an
additional check to insure compliance and guarantees minimum stan-
dards for employee welfare. This rationale extends from Congress'
finding that the business community itself failed to provide an effective
remedy to correct this employment problem. Without this threat of legal
action, a supervisor's inappropriate conduct may not be deterred. Al-
though the business employer may be in a better financial position to
compensate an aggrieved employee, by providing alternative account-
ability for the individual supervisor who made the employment decision,
the FMLA will realize its full potential and achieve Congress' desired
results.
V. CONCLUSION
Careful consideration of the policies behind the enactment of the
FMLA shows Congress intended a broad statute to grant expansive cov-
erage for working individuals. In the statute, Congress intended the
FMLA to include certain aspects of anti-discrimination provisions.2 °6
Stopping short of flatly adopting an anti-discrimination statute, Con-
gressional debate demonstrated the FMLA's main purpose was to man-
date a new labor standard.2 °7 Although the FMLA included this explicit
reference to an anti-discrimination provision, the Act borrows the defi-
205. Lenhoff & Withers, Implementation of the Family and Medical Leave
Act: Toward the Family-Friendly Workplace, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 39, 52-
3 (1994).
206. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.102.
207. See 139 Cong. Rec. S1254, 1257 (Feb. 3,1993) (statements of Sen.
Dodd).
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nition of "employer" directly from their previous FLSA legislation. By
imposing the standards set forth in the FLSA, Congress removed any
question as to whether the principle of respondeat superior would apply
when considering the term "employer" within the FMLA. With no
mention of agency language in the statute, the courts have appropriately
developed an "operational control test" to address whether a supervisor
meets the statutory definition in the FMLA. If a supervisor meets this
"operational test," the penalties established by the FMLA contain provi-
sions usually enforced against corporations and individuals. Thus, when
interpreting future FMLA cases, courts should interpret the term "em-
ployer" in the same fashion as it is used in the FLSA and find that an
individual supervisor can be personally liable for an FMLA violation.

